

# Security - Logging & Computer Forensics

Note Title

4/14/2011

## Announcements

- Two articles you can use for "good faith" paper (which is due next Tuesday)
  - no extensions!
- Lab 5 is posted
  - reading due by Tuesday
  - check point on Wed. the 20<sup>th</sup>
  - final version due Wed. the 27<sup>th</sup>
- Check finals schedule & notify me of any conflicts

# Computer Forensics

The branch of forensics that specializes in recovering digital evidence from a sequence of unknown events, usually for eventual use in a court of law.

We've all seen CSI, but as more crimes "go digital", different expertise is needed.

Fingerprints are hard to fake, but what about digital evidence?

## Digital DNA

- Username (typically in log files)
- Network Address
- CPU Serial Numbers - on Pentium III's  
until ~2000
- Hardware / Software artifacts
- Software watermarks  
Ex: GUID in MS Office  
(used to track Melissa Worm)
- Encryption keys

## Tools

- ① Disk imaging + hashing
- ② Text or binary editors  
Ex: Unix strings
- ③ System Logs ← more today
- ④ Network Scanners
- ⑤ Software Scanners
- ⑥ Data recovery

## Issues in Forensics

- Chain of custody

First thing is to image & then  
never touch original

- Cryptographic hashes

Periodically checked for tampering

## A word of caution

Computer forensics is delicate, + without legal authorization, illegal!

(So stay on DETER or your own private machine!)

Even in legal investigations, care must be taken not to exceed the warrant.


Main Element: Logging

2 issues:

① How to configure ahead of time

② How to use effectively after an issue has occurred.

Auditing :





# Auditing: What to collect

## Issues:

- Amount of data:  
quantity versus efficiency/space

## Possibilities:

- events relating to audit software
- events relating to security mechanisms
- intrusion detection & firewall events
- system management events
- system calls to OS
- remote access or logins
- access to some applications

Separation of audits:

① System level

② Application level

③ User level

## ① System Level

- + includes login attempts, devices used,
- + OS functions performed
- also useful for monitoring system performance

Ex:

```
Jan 27 17:14:04 host1 login: ROOT LOGIN console
Jan 27 17:15:04 host1 shutdown: reboot by root
Jan 27 17:18:38 host1 login: ROOT LOGIN console
Jan 27 17:19:37 host1 reboot: rebooted by root
Jan 28 09:46:53 host1 su: 'su root' succeeded for user1 on /dev/tty0
Jan 28 09:47:35 host1 shutdown: reboot by user1
Jan 28 09:53:24 host1 su: 'su root' succeeded for user1 on /dev/tty1
Feb 12 08:53:22 host1 su: 'su root' succeeded for user1 on /dev/tty1
Feb 17 08:57:50 host1 date: set by user1
Feb 17 13:22:52 host1 su: 'su root' succeeded for user1 on /dev/tty0
```

## ② Application - Level

- detect security violations within an application, or flaws in application

Ex: mail delivery system:

```
Apr 9 11:20:22 host1 AA06370: from=<user2@host2>, size=3355, class=0
Apr 9 11:20:23 host1 AA06370: to=<user1@host1>, delay=00:00:02, stat=Sent
Apr 9 11:59:51 host1 AA06436: from=<user4@host3>, size=1424, class=0
Apr 9 11:59:52 host1 AA06436: to=<user1@host1>, delay=00:00:02, stat=Sent
Apr 9 12:43:52 host1 AA06441: from=<user2@host2>, size=2077, class=0
Apr 9 12:43:53 host1 AA06441: to=<user1@host1>, delay=00:00:01, stat=Sent
```

vary greatly depending on app

### ③ User-level

- holds users accountable
- can define "normal" behavior over time

Ex: Commands executed by users  
(on UNIX system)

```
rcp      user1  tty0  0.02 secs Fri Apr 8 16:02
ls       user1  tty0  0.14 secs Fri Apr 8 16:01
clear    user1  tty0  0.05 secs Fri Apr 8 16:01
rpcinfo  user1  tty0  0.20 secs Fri Apr 8 16:01
nroff    user2  tty2  0.75 secs Fri Apr 8 16:00
sh       user2  tty2  0.02 secs Fri Apr 8 16:00
mv       user2  tty2  0.02 secs Fri Apr 8 16:00
sh       user2  tty2  0.03 secs Fri Apr 8 16:00
col      user2  tty2  0.09 secs Fri Apr 8 16:00
man      user2  tty2  0.14 secs Fri Apr 8 15:57
```

## Physical Access

Any critical system will be kept in a secured location.

Why?

If you have physical access, you can break in!

So door access, modification of access privileges, etc., is also relevant log information.

## Protecting log data

Generally, 3 options

① Read / write on a host

- log files

- separate server, encryption

② Write-once, read-many device

- CD-ROM

- Magnetic tapes

③ Write only device

- printer

# Logging in Windows

## Windows Event Log:

Each event gets a numeric ID code, set of attributes (such as task, opcode, version, keywords), plus optional user supplied data

## 3 types of logs:

- system event log
- application event log
- security event log



## Windows (cont)

Auditing can be enabled in 9 categories:

- Account logon events
- Account management
- Directory service access
- Logon events (local)
- Object access
- Policy changes
- Privilege use
- Process tracking
- System events

# Windows example

```
Event Type:      Success Audit
Event Source:    Security
Event Category:  (1)
Event ID:        517
Date:            3/6/2006
Time:            2:56:40 PM
User:            NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Computer:        KENT
Description:     The audit log was cleared
Primary User Name:  SYSTEM      Primary Domain:  NT AUTHORITY
Primary Logon ID:  (0x0,0x3F7)    Client User Name: userk
Client Domain:     KENT        Client Logon ID: (0x0,0x28BFD)
```

## UNIX logging

Syslog is the default found on all UNIX systems

Elements:

- syslog(): API referenced by several standard utilities, & available to applications
- logger - command to add entries to system log
- /etc/syslog.conf
- syslogd

Not uniform across UNIX systems!

## Basic services:

- capture relevant events
- store them
- transmit to central machine, a syslog server

## Other functions:

- robust filtering: basic is only facility + priority, but adds host or program & source or other filters
- log analysis: originally, no analysis
- event response
- log file encryption
- database storage
- rate limiting (to resist DDOS)

# Unix example

```
Mar 1 06:25:43 server1 sshd[23170]: Accepted publickey for server2 from  
172.30.128.115 port 21011 ssh2
```

```
Mar 1 07:16:42 server1 sshd[9326]: Accepted password for murugiah from  
10.20.30.108 port 1070 ssh2
```

```
Mar 1 07:16:53 server1 sshd[22938]: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for  
ip10.165.nist.gov failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!
```

```
Mar 1 07:26:28 server1 sshd[22572]: Accepted publickey for server2 from  
172.30.128.115 port 30606 ssh2
```

```
Mar 1 07:28:33 server1 su: BAD SU kkent to root on /dev/tty2
```

```
Mar 1 07:28:41 server1 su: kkent to root on /dev/tty2
```