

CSA 3/00

Asymmetric  
Encryption



Today

- Posted issue w/ HW:
  - #1: use all 3 types
  - #2: if no soln,  
tell me why
- HW due Friday

Last time

AES:

(also a bunch of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ )

Since working in  
 $\mathbb{Z}_{256}$  or  $\mathbb{Z}_{512}$ ,  
addition is XOR

Weakness:

Need a common key  
(secret)

More interesting:

How do we agree on a secret key?

Best way: Physically exchange

However, impractical for things like web traffic or email.

Public Key Cryptography:

Encryption function  $E$ ,  
decryption  $D$

Goals:

①  $D(E(M)) = M$   
(and  $E(D(M)) = M$ )

②  $E + D$  are fast

③ Given  $E$ , hard to derive  $D$

# Diffie-Hellman Key exchange

From "New directions in cryptography"

by Diffie + Hellman in 1976

Daily conspiracy tidbit:

Actually discovered by UK government in 1973!

## Key exchange:

- Start with  $\mathbb{Z}_p$

( $p$  prime or power of a prime)

These groups have multiplicative inverses:

i.e.  $2x = 1 \pmod{5}$

$x = 3$  is inverse

## The protocol: Alice + Bob:

- $p$  +  $s < p$  are both public  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
- Alice chooses secret  $a < p$   
Bob chooses secret  $b < p$
- Alice ~~posts~~ <sup>sends</sup>  $A = s^a \text{ mod } p$   
Bob ~~posts~~ <sup>sends</sup>  $B = s^b \text{ mod } p$

Alice computes:

$$K = B^a \text{ mod } p$$

Bob computes:

$$K = A^b \text{ mod } p$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} B^a &= (s^b)^a \\ A^b &= (s^a)^b \end{aligned} \right\} = S^{ab}$$

Example:

•  $s=2$ ,  $p=29$

• Alice picks  $a=3$

Bob picks  $b=7$

$$A = 2^3 \pmod{29}$$

$$\equiv 8 \leftarrow \text{Alice sends}$$

$$B = 2^7 \pmod{29}$$

$$\equiv 12 \leftarrow \text{Bob sends}$$

$$8^7 \pmod{29}$$

$$12^3 \pmod{29}$$

$$\left. \vphantom{\begin{matrix} 8^7 \\ 12^3 \end{matrix}} \right\} = 17$$

Why?

Common key is  $k = S^{ab} \pmod p$

Public info:  $p, S, A = S^a \pmod p$   
and  $B = S^b \pmod p$

What can an attacker try?

$$\begin{aligned} A \cdot B &= (S^a)(S^b) \\ &= S^{a+b} \quad \times \end{aligned}$$

Attacker must find  
"hidden" exponent.



# Hardness?

At its root, the key to why this is difficult is the discrete log problem:

Remember logarithms?

$$\log_{10} 1000 =$$

$$\log_2 1024 =$$

Here, discrete version:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Given } A, \text{ find } \log_s A \\ = \log_s s^A \quad \underline{\text{modulo } p} \end{aligned}$$

How hard?

This problem is connected  
to factoring

↳ NOT NP-Hard!

But no efficient algorithms  
are known. ↵

*polynomial*

Other key exchange algorithms  
work in other groups  
(like elliptic curves)

RSA : Rivest, Shamir & Adleman

Its hardness is tied to factoring

⇒ any fast algorithm to factor a number would break RSA.

First: more number theory!

Euler's totient function,  $\Phi(n)$ :

$\Phi(n) :=$  # of positive integers  $\leq n$  that are relatively prime to  $n$ .

Ex.  $\Phi(12) = \overset{1, 5, 7, 11}{\cancel{2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10}} 4$

If  $p$  is prime:

$$\Phi(p) = p - 1$$

$$\Phi(7) = \overset{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}{6}$$

What about non-primes?

Interesting special case when

$$\underline{n = pq}, \quad p \neq q \text{ prime}$$

What is not relatively  
prime with  $n$ ?

Divisors:  $p, q$   
 $2p, 3p, \dots, q \cdot p$   
 $2q, 3q, \dots, qp$

So  $\Phi(pq) =$

$$pq - p - (q-1) \\ \dots = (q-1)(p-1)$$



So:

To compute inverses, need

- gcd algorithm ↵

-  $\Phi(n)$

Then Euler's thm:

$$x^{\Phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow x \cdot (x^{\Phi(n)-1}) \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

More generally, inverses  
in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  are a bit  
more complex...

# Back to RSA: (ie why we care!)

Steps: Select 2 large primes  $p$  &  $q$

• Let  $n = pq$

$$\hookrightarrow \Phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

• Select  $e$  &  $d$  s.t.

-  $e$  and  $\Phi(n)$  are relatively prime

$$- ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi(n)}$$

→ How to get  $d$ ?

# Computing inverses:

Remember Euclidean alg:

$$\gcd(x, n) = d \leftarrow$$

$$\gcd \text{ here} = 1$$

Can augment EA to give

$$ix + jn = \gcd(x, n) = d$$

Now, if  $\gcd(x, n) = 1$ :

$$ix + jn = 1$$

in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ ,

$$ix = 1 \pmod n$$



# Extended Euclidean Algorithm:

Euclidean algorithm  
computed:

$$d = \gcd(a, b)$$

by doing

$$\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, \underbrace{a \bmod b})$$

$$\text{Let } r = \underline{a \bmod b}$$

$$\Rightarrow a = bq + r$$

for some  $q \in \mathbb{Z}$

We will modify Euc Alg so  
that each call returns  
not just the gcd, but  
also  $i + j$

$$\text{where } d = i \cdot b + j \cdot r$$

$$1 =$$

inverse  
mod  $b$

Some ugly math:

Goal:

$$\text{Had } r = a \bmod b$$

$$\text{and } a = qb + r$$

$$\Rightarrow r = a - qb$$

$$\text{If } d = ib + jr$$

$$= ib + j(a - qb)$$

$$= \underbrace{j \cdot a}_{\text{here is } a^{-1} \text{ mod } b} + (i - jq)b$$

$\underbrace{j}_{a^{-1} \text{ mod } b}$  here is  
inverse mod  $b$ .

Extended Euc Alg (a, b):

If  $b = 0$   
return  $(a, \underline{1}, \underline{0})$  }  $a = 1 \cdot a + 0 \cdot b$

else  
r  $\leftarrow$  a mod b

q  $\leftarrow$  integer part of  $\frac{a}{b}$

$(d, i, j) \leftarrow$

Extended Euc Alg (b, r)

return  $(d, j, \underline{i - jq})$

Runtime:

$O(\log n)$

So: RSA (Finally!)

Bob: Selects 2 large primes  $p$  &  $q$

• Let  $n = pq$

$$\hookrightarrow \Phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

• Select  $e$  &  $d$  s.t.

-  $e$  and  $\Phi(n)$  are relatively prime

-  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi(n)}$

$\hookrightarrow$  Extended Euc Alg

Now: •  $(e, n)$  is public key

•  $d$  is private key  
(also  $p$  &  $q$ )

Encrypting : Alice gets  $(e, n)$ .

She takes a message  $M$ ,  
with  $0 < M < n$ .  
(chops into pieces)

Then:

$$C \leftarrow M^e \pmod n$$

(Remember public part:  
 $(e, n)$  was key)

Alice sends  $C$  to Bob

Decryption: Bob gets  $C$

$$C = M^e \pmod n$$

Bob calculate:

$$C^d \pmod n$$

Claim:  $\hookrightarrow M$

Why?

$$\begin{aligned} C^d \pmod n &= (M^e)^d \pmod n \\ &= M^{ed} \pmod n \end{aligned}$$

Know  $ed = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

$$M^{ed} = M^{(k\phi(n)+1)} \pmod n$$

$$= \left( M^{\phi(n)} \right)^k \circ M \pmod n$$

↓ Euler's theorem

$$= 1^k \circ M \pmod n = M$$

So: Why secure?

Bob can decrypt!

He knows (secret)  $d$ .

Attacker Eve's goal:

Figure out  $d$ !

How? • Bob needed  $\bar{\phi}(n)$ , since  
 $d$  is  $e$ 's inverse mod  $n$ .

• Attacker knows  $n$   
(but not  $\bar{\phi}(n)$ ).

How to find  $\bar{\phi}(n)$ ?

So:

Whole thing is secure, as long as Eve can't get  $\Phi(n)$ , or  $p$  &  $q$ .

Bad news: Factoring is NOT NP-Hard.

Best algorithm:

Number field sieve:

$$O\left(e^{\left(\frac{64}{9}\right)^{1/3} \log n} (\log \log n)^{2/3}\right)$$



## Some practical notes

- RSA can be used to encrypt entire message (but usually isn't)
- Slow (compared to XORing)
- Easier to break than AES or other symmetric protocols
- Also: I was assuming  $(M, n) = 1!$

Here, saved since  $n = pq$ ,  
 $\forall M$  will be relatively prime to  $p$  or  $q$ .

